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We are all Wasatiyyun: 
The Shifting Sands of Center Positioning in Egypt’s Early Post-
Revolutionary Party Politics 
 
Abstract: This article focuses on a common rhetorical referent in Egyptian public imagery and parlance–that of 
wasat (center) and its derivatives wasati/wasatiyya (centrist/centrism)–and discusses how it has been appropriated 
and molded in the sphere of party polit ics. Inductive in  approach, it examines the rhetorical appropriations of the 
center ground by party officials, revealing not only its popularity as a marker of (ideological) self-positioning but its 
malleability and contextuality. The article concludes that in Egyptian party politics  the center positioning of parties 
cannot be gauged exclusively from the study of party manifestos and/or expert surveys, but ought to include 
contextual analysis of how this and other ideological markers are appropriated and given meaning in elite rhetoric.    
 
Keywords: Egypt, political parties, centrism, political rhetoric  
 
Introduction  
In Egypt, the term wasat (center)1–and its derivatives wasati/wasatiyya (centrist/centrism)–have 
historically occupied a significant place in public imagery and parlance, being widely evoked as 
a virtue and hallmark of self- identification by ordinary citizens, religious dignitaries, party 
officials, and ruling elites. Surprisingly, however, despite its salience in public imagery, there is 
a dearth of research on the usage(s) and meaning(s) of the terms wasat/wasati/wasatiyya in the 
societal and political spheres. Indeed, a number of recent analyses into Islamic centrism and its 
infusion into the domain of (post-)Islamist organizational politics apart,2 little is known about 
how the center has been evoked and understood more widely in Egyptian public discourse 
beyond its religious connotation(s). Focusing on the realm of party politics, we seek to address 
this gap in the literature by exploring how–at the level of rhetoric–party officials from across the 
Egyptian political spectrum have deployed notions of the center. What are the meaning(s) they 
have ascribed to the center and a centrist disposition? In how far do these meanings resonate 
with notions of Islamic centrism and/or with some of the broader center evocations prevalent in 
(Western) taxonomies on party ideologies and positioning? And what factors, if any, shape the 
meanings party officials accord to the center ground?  
Addressing these questions, we contend that extant taxonomies of Egyptian party 
ideologies and positioning, as proposed for example by Jacopo Carbonari, Mazen Hassan and 
                                                                 
1 Alongside ‘center’, the term is variably translated as middle, intermediate, moderate, ordinary o r fair. See H. Wehr 
(1979) A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic. (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz Verlag), p. 1066. 
2  See e.g. A. El Sherif (2016) The Strong Egypt Party: Representing a Progressive/Democratic Islamist 
Party?, Contemporary Islam, 10(3), pp. 311-331; J. Høigilt (2010) Rhetoric and Ideology in  Egypt's Wasa ṭiyya 
Movement, Arabica, 2(3), pp. 251-266; C. R. Wickham (2004) The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in 
the Formation  of Egypt's Wasat Party, Comparative Politics, 36(2), pp. 205-228;  S. Polka (2003) The Centrist 
Stream in Egypt and its Role in the Public Discourse Surrounding the Shaping of the Country's Cultural Identity, 




Daniel Tavana fail to capture the rhetorical malleability and contextuality of the center ground.3 
Consequently, we suggest that any comprehensive exploration of the Egyptian party spectrum–
and the dynamic positioning of political parties within it–ought to be broadened in scope beyond 
the longitudinal study of party programmes/manifestos to an analysis of the processes of 
meaning-making of ideological markers such as the left, right or center. In fact, we hold that, 
wherever the programmatic contours of political parties remain vague and/or resonate little with 
the electorate–as was the case in 2011-12 Egypt 4 –it is likely that rhetorical references to 
ideological markers, and the meaning(s) afforded them, remain characterized by fluidity, change, 
and contention. In these contexts, the meanings of political terms such as left, right or center 
cannot, and should not, be assumed as given or fixed, but ought to be themselves the subject of 
scholarly scrutiny.  
To substantiate the above propositions, this article draws on, and examines, primary data 
grounded in an innovative research design involving two rounds of interviews conducted with 
the same set of party officials at distinct (yet sufficiently proximate) junctures during the 
tumultuous June to November 2013 period;5 a first conducted during the final days of Mohamed 
Morsi’s rule in mid-June, and a second five months later during the short- lived interim 
                                                                 
3 J. Carbonari (2012) Map of Egyptian Political Parties. First Phase of Parliamentary Elections (28 November 2011), 
European Parliament Publication, pp. 1-8; M. Hassan (2012) The Map of Egypt’s Political Parties for the 2011 
Elections, Doha Institute, 12 January; D. L. Tavana (2011) Party Pro liferat ion and Electoral Transition in Post-
Mubarak Egypt, The Journal of North African Studies, 16(4), pp. 555-571.    
4 In the immediate post-uprising era polit ical parties remained plagued by numerous internal deficiencies, including 
most notably a lack in nationwide organisational structures, financial resource and detailed polit ical programmes. In 
his analysis of the 2011-12 parliamentary elect ion campaign Hassan, for instance, draws particular attention to the 
widespread lack of party programmatic clarity, asserting that ‘in general terms, these manifestos addressed Egypt’s 
most pressing problems like unemployment, education and healthcare with extremely general phrases and promises 
of increased spending without specifying how the suggested measu res will be financed’ See M. Hassan (2013) 
Elections of the People’s Assembly, Egypt 2011/12, Electoral Studies, 32, p. 372. For Virgin ie Collombier the 
absence of differentiated party manifestos  at the time was the combined result of a realisation by party leaders that 
‘most citizens are still expecting services from their representatives, and that affiliations and reputation matter much 
more than any party label’, as well as the prevailing popularity of relig ious/moral issues over bread-and-butter 
matters in public discourse. See V. Collombier (2013) Politics without Parties: Political Change and Democracy 
Building in Egypt Before and After the Revolution, EUI Working Papers, pp. 11-12.  
5 A total of 25 semi-structured interviews were conducted with officials from across the party political spectrum 
based on purposeful maximum variation sampling. The sample includes officials from political parties belonging to 
what is widely classed as the Islamic/Islamist current, including Hizb al-Hurriyya wa al-‘Adala (Freedom and 
Justice Party/FJP), Hizb al-Tayyar al-Misri (Egyptian Current Party/ECP), Hizb al-Nur, or commonly known as al-
Nour (Party of Light/al-Nour) and Hizb al-Watan (Homeland Party/Watan); the liberal and right-wing currents, 
including Hizb  Ghad  al-Thawra (Revolut ion’s Tomorrow Party/ Ghad), Hizb  al-Mu’tamar al-Misri (Egyptian 
Conference Party; henceforth Conference Party), Hizb al-Jabha al-Dimuqrat i (Democratic Front Party/DFP), Hizb 
al-Wafd al-Jadid (New Wafd Party/NWP), Hizb al-Islah wa al-Tanmiyyah–Misruna (Reform and Development–
Misruna Party/RDMP) and Hizb al-Misriyyin al-Ahrar (Free Egyptians Party/FEP); and the center-left and leftist 
currents, including Hizb al-Tahaluf al-Sha‘bi al-Ishtiraki (Popular Socialist Alliance Party/PASP), Hizb al-
Tajammu‘ al-Taqaddumi al-Wahdawi (National Progressive Unionist Party/NPUP), Hizb  al-Karama (Dignity 
Party/al-Karama) and Hizb al-Misri al-Dimuqrati al-Ijtimaʿi (Egyptian Social Democratic Party/ESDP).  
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presidency of Adly Mansour and his Prime Minister (PM) Hazem al-Beblawi.6 The data thus 
collated not only reveals the popularity of the center as a referent of partisan self-placement 
across the political spectrum, but importantly its rhetorical malleability and contextuality. In the 
interviews at hand, this malleability finds expression in the multiple frames party officials 
deployed when denoting the center ground and their placement within it. Beyond reference to a 
religious median (however defined), these entailed both economic and procedural center 
evocations. Its contextuality, meanwhile, transpires from close comparative scrutiny of the two 
rounds of interviews, which reveal variance in the onus party officials placed on certain center 
evocations and the value they attached to it as a rhetorical asset. Whilst by the end of the Morsi 
era party officials gravitated strategically towards a religious centre evocation as a means to 
brush up their parties’ Islamic credentials in a political climate that at the time was dominated by 
Islamists in government, this changed significantly during the interim period which, with al-
Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood/MB) removed from the political equation, saw party 
officials shift their onus away from religious to economic centre articulations.  
Two methodological provisos pertaining to our data are in order. For one, this article 
does not claim to provide an exhaustive account of all rhetorical permutations of the center in 
Egyptian party political rhetoric, which requires exploring a much larger sample of party 
representatives. All we infer from the available evidence is that center conceptions are multiple 
and variable depending on context. Given its focus on the latter half of 2013, our analysis is also 
circumscribed by time. This is particularly relevant for the study of context on center 
conceptualisations, which in our research is limited to the final days of the Morsi presidency and 
the interim period preceding the rise to power of al-Sisi. A broader discussion of iterations of the 
center vocabulary during the pre-uprising era and/or the al-Sisi presidency from 2014 onwards is 
hence not possible and will require further investigation.  
 
Rethinking political parties and the center ground  
Despite its common usage in everyday parlance, political discourse, and academic writings, 
remarkably little theoretical clarity exists on what constitutes the center and centrism in party 
politics. A cursory look at the relevant (Western) literature attests to this. In some spatial models 
of party ideologies, for instance, the center location constitutes a definable geometrical mid-
                                                                 
6 During both interview sessions, respondents were asked about their center conceptions and placement. The authors 
deemed this particular interview design a robust and appropriate means to test the impact of polit ical change on elite 
rhetoric, keeping the timeframe between interview sessions minimal, thus controlling for significant changes in 
broader socio-cultural and economic context. We thank Karim Malak for conducting the second round of interviews 
in November 2013.  
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point between two ideological extremes to the left and the right respectively. An illustrative 
example is the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), 7 which maps the election manifestos of 
European political parties onto a composite left-right ideological scale. Using the rile- index, this 
scale is ‘theoretically bounded’ at the extreme left (-100) and right (+100), thus featuring an 
ideological mid-point at the 0 mark. Other models of party positioning, meanwhile, stay clear of 
one-size-fits-all left-right scales, proposing instead spatial models that acknowledge that the 
meaning of left and right (and the center for that matter) may vary from country to country as 
well as over time. 8  Unlike the CMP, these models are thus premised around a more 
temporal/contextual understanding of party positioning, and one in which the meaning and 
location of the center are derived from the specificities of the spectrum of political parties 
operating in any given polity.  
This notion of contextuality and variability of the center ground also resonates with some 
behavioral models of party competition.9 Indeed, some of the core theoretical (albeit empirically 
contested) assumptions underpinning these models entail 1) the proposition that political 
parties/candidates are rational vote/plurality-maximizers, single-mindedly focused on winning 
public office, and that hence their manifestos constitutes little more than a means to this end, 2) 
that voter preferences are ‘single-peaked’ in a one-dimensional ideological/policy space, with 
most voters clustered around the median position and 3) that political parties strive to tap into the 
median vote by gravitating towards this electoral center.10 This electoral center, however, is not 
static but, as numerous scholars have elucidated, variable not least in part due to changes in 
public opinion over time.11 Determined by voter preferences rather than party manifestos, in 
these behavioral models of party competition, the center is thus again treated as context-specific 
and variable. Above all, it is conceived of as a tactical location that rationally-acting party elites 
seek to strive for in their battles for votes and power.  
In Western public discourse outside academia as well, centrism carries a range of 
connotations which are not always tied to ideological left-right thinking and not always positive. 
For some, for instance, a centrist (party political) position represents a politics of moderation, 
temperance, compromise, gradualism, pragmatism or reform; a conceptualization of the center 
                                                                 
7 Also known as Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR).  
8 See e.g. T. König, M. Marbach and M. Osnabrügge (2013) Estimating Party Positions across Countries and Time: 
A Dynamic Latent Variable Model for Manifesto Data, Political Analysis, 21(4), pp. 468-491. 
9 See e.g. J. Adams, M. Clark, L. Ezrow and G. Glasgow (2004) Understanding Change and Stability in  Party 
Ideologies: Do Parties Respond to Public Opinion or to Past Elect ion Results?, British Journal of Political Science, 
34(4), pp. 589-610.  
10 F. Petry (1982) Vote-Maximizing versus Utility-Maximizing Candidates: Comparing Dynamic Models of Bi-
Party Competition, Quality and Quantity, 16(6), p. 507. 
11 Adams, Clark, et al. Understanding Change and Stability in Party Ideologies , pp. 589-610. 
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that–as evidenced below–has also been evoked by party officials in Egypt during the period 
under investigation. For others, meanwhile, it stands metaphorically for political indecisiveness, 
assimilation, status quo politics or a hollow policy discourse.12 In the realm of everyday politics 
then, center conceptualizations are as diverse as they are in academic usage, highlighting yet 
again the associative elasticity of the concept and the difficulty of pinning it down to a set of 
core characteristics.  
 
The center as a malleable discursive sphere  
It is this associative elasticity, as well as its relational qualities alluded to above, that reside at 
the heart of our conceptualization of the center as a rhetorical device in Egyptian party political 
rhetoric. Indeed, as spelled out in the introduction, what we are interested in is the process of 
appropriation and meaning-making of the center and centrist stances by multiple party officials 
at any given time, rather than a mapping exercise of centrist political forces within a quantifiable 
left-right policy/ideological spectrum, which–as will be elucidated below–we deem problematic 
in the Egyptian context. As such, we follow the work of Jonathan White who–shedding new 
light on the study of the left-right binary in European party politics–moves away from a usage of 
the two concepts that is tied exclusively to the ideas ‘they do or do not index’,13 to a broader 
understanding of left and right that explores how they are ‘invoked and put to work in political 
discourse’.14 As White suggests, ‘(…) “left” and “right” are discursive resources drawn upon, 
contested and resisted in political exchange–themselves the site of conflict as much as an 
exogenous device for its representation’.15 In his theorizing, White hence not only opens up the 
possibility that these terms can take on different meanings but encourages analysis of their 
tactical value as rhetorical assets and as sites of elite contestation.   
In the Egyptian setting as well, our findings suggest that Western-centric composite left-
right scales–and the center placement within them–are not only inadequate in capturing the 
specificities of the local party landscape, but in elucidating the multiple and diverse evocations 
by party elites of the center ground. This, for one, is due to the lack of programmatic clarity and 
the ideological fluidity that remain hallmarks of Egyptian party politics and that render difficult 
                                                                 
12 K. Lenk (2009) Vom Mythos der Politischen Mitte. Philosophie der Mitte: Abschied von der Utopie, Aus Politik 
und Zeitgeschichte, 38. 
13  J. White (2010) Left, Right and Beyond: The Pragmatics of Political Mapping, LSE ‘Europe in Question’ 
Discussion Paper Series, 24, p. 2. 
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid. Note that White’s research agenda aligns closely with a broader academic debate on the universality of 
ideological concepts such as the left o r right in voter, electoral and party research. See. e.g. P. C. Bauer, P. Barberá, 
K. Ackermann and A. Venetz (2017) Is the Left -Right Scale a Valid  Measure of Ideology?, Political Behaviour, 
39(3), pp. 553-583. 
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any clear-cut ideological demarcations. 16  It is also, however, due to the pervasiveness of 
religious norms in public discourse and policy that render inaccurate composite left-right scales 
which associate the left with a secular disposition and the right with a religious one. 17 In Egypt 
this connect simply does not stand given that here we encounter, for instance, numerous so-
called Islamist parties advocating right- or left-wing economic policies.18  
Most significantly, the data suggests that conceptualizing notions such as the 
center/centrism as mere expressions of an ideological/policy mid-point on a composite left-right 
scale is not only flawed (for the above reasons), but unable to capture the contested and bounded 
nature of the center sphere that transpires from a closer reading of the center vocabulary 
deployed by party elites. By contested, we refer to the claim- and counter-claim making to the 
center ground that tends to characterize the everyday interaction between political agents. By 
bounded, in turn, we refer to the interplay between elite rhetoric and setting, and the fact that the 
meanings associated with a center position/location are malleable and filled with content 
depending on context.  
What we hence propose here is a broadening out of how we conceptualize party 
ideologies and positioning within the Egyptian context, or for that ma tter within party systems 
that are nascent and/or marked by significant ideological ambiguity and fluidity. The study of 
party diffusion and positioning in these circumstances not only needs to be sensitive to context 
but move beyond the study of party manifestos to an analysis of elite rhetoric. Indeed, it is this 
attention to political rhetoric that brings into focus the malleability of ideological frames, their 
often multiple usages as well as their changes over time. 
 
The center in spatial models of Egyptian party politics  
Possibly due to the pitfalls alluded to above, few scholars have as yet attempted to map Egypt’s 
political parties on a quantifiable ideological/policy scale. Indeed, although a range of excellent 
analyses are nowadays available on individual political parties and multiparty/opposition politics 
pre- and post Egyptian uprising,19 little scholarly effort has thus far gone into mapping their 
                                                                 
16 See e.g. H. Kraetzschmar and A. Saleh (2018) Political Parties and Secular–Islamist Polarization in post-Mubarak 
Egypt, in H. Kraetzschmar and P. Rivetti (eds) Islamists and the Politics of the Arab Uprisings: Governance, 
Pluralisation and Contention (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press), pp. 230-233.  
17 See e.g. O. Knutsen (1995) Value Orientations, Political Conflicts and Left ‐Right Identification: A Comparative 
Study, European Journal of Political Research , 28(1), p. 63.  
18  See e.g. B. Zo llner (2018) Does Participation Lead to Moderation? Understanding Changes in the Egyptian 
Islamist Parties post-Arab Spring, in H. Kraetzschmar and P. Rivetti (eds) Islamists and the Politics of the Arab 
Uprisings: Governance, Pluralisation and Contention  (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press), pp. 149-165. 
19  See e.g. J.M. Landau (2015) Parliaments and Parties in Egypt . (Abingdon: Routledge); H. Albrecht, 
(2013) Raging against the Machine: Political Opposition under Authoritarianism in Egypt  (Syracuse, New York: 
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ideological diffusion within a one- or two-dimensional policy spaces, the exception being the 
spatial models developed on the nascent post-2011 party system by amongst others Carbonari, 
Hassan and Tavana.20  
Building on Western spatial representations of party positioning, Carbonari, Hassan and 
Tavana developed two-dimensional models within which they sought to locate Egypt’s political 
parties based on manifesto data. In all three cases, this dimensionality rests on the assumption 
that Egyptian party politics is characterized by two principle ideological fault lines; an economic 
left-right cleavage and a religious-secular one. Whereas Western composite left-right spatial 
models, such as the CMP, presume congruence between left and secular and right and religious, 
Carbonari, Hassan and Tavana recognize the problems that reside in its applicability to the 
Egyptian context. As such they are correct in disentangling the two ideological cleavages and in 
representing them as discrete axes in a two-dimensional policy space.21 As mentioned earlier, 
this enables a more nuanced placement of Egypt’s political parties, one that recognizes that 
entities on the left and right might have religious or non-religious dispositions.  
This said, the Carbonari and Tavana taxonomies in particular suffer from several 
shortcomings, some of which pertain explicitly to conceptualizations of the center ground.22 
Tavana, for instance, not only fails to map individual political parties onto his two-dimensional 
policy space–thus leaving the reader to guess where the parties he references are actually 
located–but provides little substance to his claim that ‘most, if not all, parties [espouse] 
programmes somewhere in the middle’23 of the secular-religious axis. From Tavana’s account 
and figural depiction, this claim is lacking in verifiability. Moreover, whilst Tavana presents an 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Syracuse University Press); K. al-Anani and M. Malik (2013) Pious Way to Politics: The Rise of Political Salafis m 
in Post-Mubarak Egypt, Digest of Middle East Studies 22(1) pp. 57-73; H. Sallam (2013) Egypt’s Parliamentary 
Elections: A Critical Guide to a Changing Political Arena (Washington DC: Tadween Publishing); M. Farag (2012) 
Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood and the January 25 Revolution: New Political Party, New Circumstances, 
Contemporary Arab Affairs,  5(2), pp. 214-229; D. Shehata (2009) Islamists and Secularists in Egypt: Opposition, 
Conflict and Cooperation (Abingdon: Routledge); J. Stacher (2004) Part ies Over: The Demise of Egypt's 
Opposition Parties, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 31(2), pp. 215-233;  A. al-Ghaffar Shukor (2003) 
Political Parties in  Egypt, in : H. Mustafa, A. al-Ghaffar Shukor and  A.H. Rabi (eds) Building Democracy in Egypt: 
Women’s Political Participation, Political Party Life and Democratic Elections , pp. 31-50 (International IDEA); M. 
Makram Ebeid (1989) The Role of the Officia l Opposition, in: C. Tripp and R. Owen (eds) Egypt Under Mubarak , 
pp. 21-52 (Abingdon/New York: Routledge). 
20 In a recent intervention on the subject, Michelle Dunne and Amr Hamzawy also present a taxonomy of Egypt’s 
(secular) political part ies post-2011-12. Voicing concern about the usefulness of the ‘usual right-to-left spectrum’ in 
mapping Egypt’s secular part ies, they opt , however, for a taxonomy that positions these parties on a scale ‘o f 
proximity to the state’ instead. See M. Dunne and A. Hamzawy (2017) Egypt’s Secular Political Part ies: A Struggle 
for Identity and Independence, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp. 4-8. 
21 Carbonari, Map of Egyptian Polit ical Parties , pp. 1; Hassan, The Map of Egypt’s Political Parties ; Tavana, Party 
Proliferation, p. 562. 
22  Tavana, Party Proliferation, pp. 560-562; Carbonari, Map of Egyptian Polit ical Part ies. Note Carbonari’s 
placement of political parties is based on manifesto data and party statements.   
23 Tavana, Party Proliferation, p. 561. 
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interesting triangulation of groupings of political parties (liberals, religious and socialists) which 
suggests a de facto center ground in Egyptian party politics that is slightly off to the left on the 
economic scale, he yet again presents little empirical evidence to sustain this point.24  
 
Figure 1: Dual-Preference Political Spectrum (Tavana)  
 
Source: D. L. Tavana (2011) Party Proliferation and Electoral Transition in post -Mubarak Egypt, The 
Journal of North African Studies, 16(4), p. 562 
 
In Carbonari’s model, meanwhile, the problem resides not so much in a lack of 
specificity, but with the labeling of political parties (particularly those classed as centrist) and 
their placement within his two-dimensional ideological x/y-axis. For one, there is little clarity 
what in terms of ideology a center party stands for and how it differs from those classed as 
liberal. Moreover, given that Carbonari’s placement of political parties is based on manifesto 
data, it is bewildering to see such vast discrepancies in the mapping of some of the center parties 
in the model. Illustrative of this are the placements of the Human Rights and Citizenship Party 
(top right-hand quadrant) and the Egyptian Alliance Party (lower left-hand quadrant), both of 
which Carbonari classes as centrist. Given their distances on both the x- and y-axes of the model, 





                                                                 
24 Ibid, p. 562.  
25 Such discrepancies are, in fact, also evident across taxonomies. Although presumably based on the same pre-
2011/12 manifesto data, Hassan and Carbonari come to vastly different conclusion about which  parties to designate 
as centrist. Whilst Hassan classes the NWP, the Wasat party and the ESDP as centrist, in Carbonari’s model neither 
of the three is labelled as such. See: Figure 2 above and Hassan, The Map of Egypt’s Political Parties.    
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Figure 2: Map of Egypt’s Political Parties (Carbonari) 
 
Source: J. Carbonari (2011) Map of Political Parties: First Phase of Parliamentary Elections (28 November 2011), 
European Parliament Publication, p. 1.  
 
Beyond these specific problems, the broader issue with these and other spatial models is 
that–unless designed longitudinally along the lines of the CMP–they offer little more than a 
snap-shot of party policy/ideological diffusion at any given point in time (in Carbonari, Hassan 
and Tavana’s case the immediate post-uprising era), hence leaving readers in the dark about 
latent/manifest shifts in party positions (and the drivers behind them). More significantly 
perhaps, we caution against placing too much faith in the explanatory power of such models in 
contexts where party manifestos remain ill-defined and where thus it is far from clear-cut how to 
position individual political parties within two/multi-dimensional policy axes. This 
problematique manifests itself, in fact, not only in the prevalence of ambiguous party manifestos 
and party system instability, but also, as we will to demonstrate below, at the level of elite 
rhetoric where a cacophony of articulations of key ideological markers, such as that of the 
center, is discernible, adding yet another layer of fluidity and contention that is not adequately 
captured by any of the above models.  
 
Center evocations in Egyptian (party) rhetoric 
Turning to the findings of this research, let us know examine more closely the center in public 
and party political rhetoric. As concerns public discourse, the term wasat and its derivatives have 
been widely used as a referent in day-to-day politics as well as in relation to formulations of the 
nation’s religious norms and identity. In both these fields, wasat/wasati/wasatiyya tend to carry 
10 
 
positive connotations, being associated with an ‘ideal’, ‘balanced’ or ‘moderate’ disposition.26 
Doctrinally, the notion can be traced back to religious scripture, with its origin residing in 
various Quranic verses, including prominently Sura al-Baqarah 2:143 which refers to the 
Muslim community as ‘ummatan wasatan’, hence as one that is ‘justly balanced’ or centrist in 
outlook.27 In the contemporary era, the notions of wasat/wasati and wasatiyya have been drawn 
upon by Islamist (and otherwise) scholars, organizations, institutions and political regimes to 
signal that they stand for a balanced and measured political/religious message and one that is 
defined in opposition to any ideological and behavioral extremes.28 Given its religious source, it 
comes as little surprise that the notion of wasatiyya has historically been most widely associated 
with various institutionalized and non-institutionalized expressions of Islamic centrism. These 
include some of Egypt’s most prominent Muslim and Islamist voices, ranging from al-Azhar to 
the MB and the so-called ‘wasatiyya current’ of like-minded Muslim intellectuals. Constituting 
part and parcel of the country’s religious establishment, al-Azhar, for instance, has traditionally 
sought to present itself as a bastion of moderation, with Ahmed Tayib, its current Grand Imam, 
describing the institution as ‘the pulpit of moderate, centrist and tolerant Islam.’29  
Outside the orbit of official Islam, meanwhile, wasatiyya has come to be associated with 
a grouping of Muslim scholars and their writings, including prominently Yusuf al-Qaradawi, 
Muhammad Salim al-‘Awwa, Fahmi Huwaydi, Muhammad ‘Ammara and Tariq al-Bishri.30 
Despite some doctrinal differences, these self-declared centrists are united by a reformist reading 
of Muslim scripture on matters pertaining to religious, social and political life. As Høigilt 
suggests, these wasatiyyun 
 
(…) reject imitation of previous authorities in Islamic thinking, but at the same 
time defend the time-honoured exegetical principles of fiqh; they support 
democracy and pluralism, but call for respecting religion; and while they disagree 
                                                                 
26 See e.g. Høigilt, ‘Rhetoric and Ideology in Egypt’, p. 252. 
27 S. Omer (2013) Al-Wasatiyyah (Moderation) as an Agenda of the Ummah, IslamiCity, 30 August. 
28 On the significance of Islamic centrism in religious scholarship in Egypt see e.g. K. Ayaka, (2017) What does 
Islamic Centris m in Egypt Strive fo r?: Reflect ion on Ṭāriq al-Bishrī’s Formulat ion of ‘Tayyār Asāsī’, Kyoto Bulletin 
of Islamic Area Studies, 10, pp. 32-41; B. K. Rutherford (2006) What Do Egypt’s Islamists Want? Moderate Islam 
and the Rise of Islamic Constitutionalism, Middle East Journal, 60(4), pp. 707-731.  
29 Anon. (2017) Reforming Islam in Egypt: Sisi versus the Sheikhs, The Economist, 18 February.  
30 See e.g. Ayaka, What does Islamic Centris m; Høigilt, Rhetoric and Ideology in Egypt, p. 251; D. H. Warren and 
C. Gilmore (2013) Citizenship and Compatriotis m in the Islamic Civ il State: The Emerging Discourse of Yusuf al-
Qaradawi and the “School of the Middle Way”, in A.U. Noi (ed) Islam and Democracy: Perspectives on the Arab 
Spring (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Publishing Scholars), p. 90.   
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with Islamic thinkers to both the left and right, they stress the need for dialogue 
and tolerance.31 
 
In their writings and discourse then, centrist scholars seek to advance an imagery of Islam that is 
broadly speaking plural, modern and non-violent in outlook, accommodating of 
constitutionalism and democracy, and one that seeks to offer a bridge between conservative 
religious identity and progressive lifestyle. As such they purport to offer an ideational meeting 
place of reform-oriented Islamiyyun (Islamists) and conservative- leaning Almaniyyun 
(secularists).32  
Beyond the confines of religious institutions and actors, the ripple waves of wasatiyya 
have also come to permeate more broadly the political discourse in Egypt, with the notio n being 
evoked in letter and/or spirit by political leaders seeking to define the essence of Egyptian 
national and/or religious identity as well as by party elites pursuant of the popular vote. 
Alongside coercion, Egyptian rulers from Hosni Mubarak down to al-Sisi have all sought to 
monopolize the political domain by wrapping their domestic and foreign policies in 
centrist/moderate cloaks.33 This has not only enabled them to define what is deemed ‘moderate ’, 
‘appropriate’ and ‘culturally-acceptable’ in religion and politics, but to denounce as 
extremists/fanatics/radicals all those challenging authoritarian incumbency. A pertinent example 
is the current president, al-Sisi, who–as Paola Caridi aptly notes–much more so than any of his 
predecessors has sought to define and ‘control the message of religious consensus’34 in Egypt to 
buttress his authority and rule, casting himself as spearheading a ‘moderate religious revolution’ 
and a rejection of (Islamist) extremism and terrorism.35  
 
Multiple center articulations in party political rhetoric  
Within Egyptian party politics as well, there is evidence to suggest that the notion of wasat and 
its derivatives have been deployed discursively as referents by leadership cadres for the purpose 
of self-positioning. As concerns those party officials interviewed, for instance, two noteworthy 
patterns are observable. First, most of them–though not all 36–contended that their political 
                                                                 
31 Høigilt, Rhetoric and Ideology, p. 253. 
32 See e.g. Polka, The Centrist Stream in Egypt, p. 40.  
33 See e.g. Mubarak speech at al-Azhar on 27 February 2010; see www.youtube.com/watch?v=wm_cYsWjS-I (last 
seen 24 October 2018).  
34 P. Caridi (2015) Consensus-Building in Al-Sisi’s Egypt, Insight Egypt, No. 7, p. 1. 
35 Ibid, p. 2.  
36 Of the officials of 14 part ies that were interviewed, only the representative from Tajammu‘ rejected outright his 
party being labeled ‘centrist’ or ‘center-left’. Interview with Tajammu‘ official (Cairo, 22 June 2013). 
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parties aspired to a center position within the political sphere. As one such official remarked, 
‘Egyptians are in love with the term wasati, so all parties pretend to be in the middle.’37 Indeed, 
party officials not only held a positive image of the center ground, however defined, but 
deliberately sought to tie their party’s position to the societal median, thus evidently viewing the 
center as an electorally beneficial location. As such they played up their own centrist credentials, 
whilst discrediting those of their competitors. Instances of such ‘centrist outbidding’ can be 
found in the deliberations of officials from Hizb at-Tahaluf al-Sha‘bi al-Ishtiraki (Popular 
Socialist Alliance Party/PSAP) and Hizb al-Misri al-Dimuqrati al-Ijtimaʿi (Egyptian Social 
Democratic Party/ESDP), both of whom proclaimed their political parties as centrist, whilst 
rejecting the traditional ideology-bridging center politics of the NWP, as well as the self-
proclaimed post- ideological stances of Hizb al-‘Adl (Justice Party/‘Adl) and Hizb al-Dustur 
(commonly known as Hizb al-Dostour; Constitution Party/Dostour)  which positioned the center 
as residing outside the traditional economic left-right and secular-Islamist binary.38 This attempt 
to delegitimise competitors serves to illustrate that in the Egyptian context the center remains a 
highly contested space.  
Second, whilst the appeal of the center ground was near universal across the party 
political spectrum, significant variance can be detected in the meanings ascribed to it, bringing to 
the fore several distinct interpretative frames. These comprise a religious, an economic as well as 
a more procedural frame.39 In the following pages, we elaborate on each of these three frames, 
before suggesting how one might make sense of this multitude of center articulation during the 
period under investigation.   
 
Religious center articulations. Given its significance in Egyptian public life, it is little surprising 
that religious connotations have featured prominently in the center articulations of party 
officials. This is probably most notable in the case of Hizb al-Wasat (Center Party, henceforth 
Wasat), 40  whose very name insinuates a close ideational connect to wasatiyya thinkers and 
whose leaders have sought to position the party as a ‘middle’ or ‘moderate’ force striving to 
                                                                 
37 Interview with Watan official (Cairo, 19 June 2013).  
38 Interview with PSAP official (Cairo, 17 June 2013) and ESDP official (Cairo, 20 June 2013 and November 2013). 
39 It should be noted that we do not claim that these center frames are per se mutually exclusive. However, as 
elaborated below, we content that significant variance can be detected in their rhetorical onus over time, one that 
warrants explanation. 
40 The party was founded as a break-away  from the MB in  1996, following a d ispute over internal reform as well as 
the formation of a Brotherhood-affiliated political party, yet only gained legal recognition in  the aftermath o f the 
2011-12 Tahrir uprising.  
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bridge the secular-Islamist divide.41  Officials from other political parties within the country’s 
religious current, including such diverse formations as the MB-affiliated Hizb al-Hurriya wa al-
‘Adala (Freedom and Justice Party/FJP), 42  Hizb al-Tayyar al-Misri (Egyptian Current 
Party/ECP) which merged into Hizb Misr al-Qawiyya (Strong Egypt Party/SEP), and the Salafi 
Hizb al-Watan (Homeland Party; henceforth Watan) have all also sought to appropriate the spirit 
and appeal of the notion of wasatiyya in their political rhetoric/outlook.43 Illustrative cases from 
amongst those interviewed include officials from the FJP and Watan, who in their deliberations 
regarded religion as a defining parameter of their center positioning. As one FJP official noted: 
‘(…) the FJP is in the center because (…) it represents the Islamic reification of the Egyptian 
bourgeoisie, the centrist [position] that is there in the urban and rural areas.’ 44 Drawing directly 
on competitors amongst Islamist parties, meanwhile, Watan's representative also exclaimed that 
his party aims ‘to be in the middle, a bit to the right of the Strong Egypt Party and al-Wasat.’45  
Having declared themselves in one form or another as religiously centrist  and/or 
moderate, it is important to bear in mind that not all of the aforementioned political parties draw 
inspiration from wasatiyya thinkers and that in fact, beyond a common rejection of political 
violence, it remains in the eyes of the beholder to identify where precisely the religious median 
resides each of these parties refer to. This is particularly pertinent amongst those forces widely 
considered on the religious right, such as Watan, but also evident in the differing positions on 
matters of religion that have been noted, for instance, in the programmes of the FJP, Wasat, the 
ECP and the SEP.46  
Religiously- infused center articulations were, however, not only confined to party 
representatives interviewed from within the Islamist current but featured prominently also in the 
rhetoric of those party officials widely regarded as belonging to the country’s ‘secular’ political 
establishment. Examples include representatives from Hizb al-Misriyyin al-Ahrar (Free 
Egyptians Party/FEP), Hizb al-Jibha al-Dimuqrati (Democratic Front Party/DFP), Hizb al-Wafd 
al-Jadid (New Wafd Party/NWP) and Hizb al-Tajammu‘ al-Taqaddumi al-Wahdawi (National 
                                                                 
41 See e.g. Høigilt, Rhetoric and Ideology, p. 253; J. A. Stacher (2002) Post-Islamist Rumblings in Egypt: The 
Emergence of the Wasat Party, The Middle East Journal, 56(3), pp. 415-432.  
42 Following the ouster of President Morsi and the military coup d’état of July 2013, the FJP’s parent organization, 
the MB, was declared a terrorist organization and the party banned. 
43 Zollner, Does Participation Lead  to Moderation?, pp. 149-165;  Anon. (2011) Egypt Elect ions: The Egyptian 
Current  Party, The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, 6 November; Interview with Watan official; Anon. (2013) 
Asharq Al-Awsat Interview: A l-Watan Deputy Leader Yusri Hamad, Asharq Al-Awsat, 7 January; El Sherif, The 
Strong Egypt Party, pp. 216;  Interviews with FJP official (Cairo, 18  June 2013) and w ith Watan official (Cairo, 19 
June 2013). 
44 Interview with FJP official (Cairo, 18 June 2013). 
45 Interview with Watan official (Cairo, 19 June 2018).  
46 See e.g. Zollner, Does Participation Lead to Moderation?, pp. 149-165. 
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Progressive Unionist Party, henceforth Tajammu‘), all of whom treated religion as a yardstick of 
their center politics and articulations.47 According to one NWP official interviewed, for instance, 
Islam constituted the binding element of a ‘reconciliatory discourse after the revolution because 
we felt that the idea of religion was hegemonic (…)’ 48 . A leading member of the leftist 
Tajammu‘, likewise, acknowledged that, while ‘(…) the secular state rejects religion at all in any 
mix in politics, in Egypt this is difficult. We take the middle ground, the middle solution on 
religion (…).’49  
Whilst attitudes towards religion are often seen as a marker that divides right- and left-
wing parties in Western contexts, it is thus evident that this is not necessarily the case in Egypt, 
where party officials–tout les couleurs–have sought to tie their center dispositions and alignment 
to the views of mainstream society and/or to matters of religious doctrine.  
 
Economic center evocations. Alongside (varied) religious dispositions, party officials have also 
drawn on the term wasat and its derivatives to signify their economic outlook and positioning 
within a broader (Western) left-right ideological framework. Reminiscent of social market 
economic models, for most party officials from the center- left and center-right alike, in fact, this 
outlook stood for a policy orientation that synthesizes an emphasis on the importance of the free 
market and foreign direct investment with ideas of social justice and state interventionism. On 
the center- left, for instance, representatives from both the ESDP and ECP asserted that their 
political parties stood for a ‘social democratic’ disposition and that post-Tahrir uprising this 
disposition defined the gravitational center of Egyptian party politics, capturing the ‘ideological 
median’ of Egyptian society.50  As one ESDP official reasoned in this regard:  
 
‘The [party political] spectrum is divided between the left ideologically, 
Tagammu, the Socialist Alliance. The center will be social democracy and al-Adl, 
who have joined us and the Dostour party. Then you have the FEP, the Congress 
Party on the right. (….) The differences within the ESDP are not that pronounced 
as they were at the beginning and everyone [in the party] has moved to the 
                                                                 
47 Interviews with an FEP officia l (Cairo, 20 June 2013), an NWP official (Cairo, 15 June 2013), a DFP official 
(Cairo, 17 June 2018), which merged with the FEP shortly after the coup, and a Tajammu‘ official (Cairo, 22 June 
2013). 
48 Interview with NWP official (Cairo, 15 June 2013). 
49 Interview with Tajammu‘ party official (Cairo, 22 June 2013). 




common land of social democracy’. (….) I believe social democracy will prevail 
when people think about parties and ideology’.51  
 
On the center-right of the political spectrum as well party officials sought to assert their centrist 
credentials through advocacy of an economic third-way. Illustrative here is, for instance, the 
deliberations of one Hizb al-Islah wa al-Tanmiyyah–Misruna (Reform and Development–
Misruna Party/RDMP) official who defines the party as center-right, confirming its advocacy of 
‘an open door economy’ that favors free-market policies and foreign direct investment. He 
waters down this policy position, however, stating that, because of Egypt’s current poverty 
levels, there is a need ‘to keep social justice in our mind’ and pursue an economic policy 
whereby ‘…maybe the state should keep all strategic industries’. 52 By not questioning the fact 
that the nationalization of industries undermines fundamental liberal economic policy principles, 
he thus appears to purport that state-interventionist and social welfarist policies are compatible 
with a center-right position and not exclusively the domain of a leftist or center- left disposition, 
stating that ‘…liberals are also promoting social justice, [the] same as the leftists and socialists. 
Everyone is today advancing social justice.’53 
Representatives of other center-right parties as well, including most notably from the 
FEP and NWP have sought to buttress their center claims by infusing free market rhetoric with 
social welfarist credentials. The official of the FEP thus stressed that ‘[s]ocial liberalism, is an 
idea that liberal parties are talking about now. (…) Everyone wants to make sure that resources 
get distributed fairly.’54 This notion was echoed by one NWP official who noted that ‘social 
democracy has become the focus of all political parties because no one can ignore 50 percent 
poverty or that there are widespread class differences’. 55 He continues to purport that his party, 
therefore, favors the introduction of a social welfare system that assuages the strain of class 
differences and the burden of poverty. Again, these positions are attributes of left-wing 
economic stances and, as such, could be read as a sign of the NWP’s intention to broaden its 
appeal beyond its traditional core constituency, which resides with the bourgeois landowning 
middle-and upper-middle classes. Considering the NWP’s historical legacy, it is, however, 
                                                                 
51 Interview with ESDP official (Cairo, 16 June 2016). 
52 Interview with RDPM official (Cairo, 16 June 2013).  
53 Interview with RDPM official (Cairo, November 2013). 
54 Interview with FEP official (Cairo, November 2013). 
55 The NWP explicit ly speak of ‘social democracy’, while the FEP official emphasizes social justice. Interviews 
with officials from the FEP (Cairo, 20 June 2013 and Cairo, November 2013) and from the NWP (Cairo, 15 June 
2013). Not facing the same ideological contradiction, center-left parties, such as the ESDP and the ECP, regard 
‘social democracy’ and ‘social justice’ as the defining element of the center; see interview with ESDP official 
(Cairo, 16 June 2016) and with the ECP (Cairo, 15 June 2013 and Cairo, 10 November 2013). 
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unlikely that this rhetoric indicates a substantive left-leaning reincarnation of the party. Rather, it 
may signify the party’s attempt to broaden its electability to a cross-section of Egyptian voters. 
As such, the NWP epitomizes the conundrum of Egypt’s entire center-right: on the one hand, the 
need to address a growing public discourse around social justice, which was heightened in the 
aftermath of the Tahrir uprising and, on the other hand, remaining loyal to their traditional 
economic position and support base. It is for this reason that the NWP depicts itself as the core 
center party that shows ‘(…) in its programme a lot of common ground with all political forces, 
liberal and left.’ 56  However, by conforming to a center discourse around the issue of social 
justice, center-right parties are at risk of becoming indistinct from competitors, both on the 
center-right and center-left, while also forfeiting the full support of the business-owning 
economic classes and the economic elite. As one Watan official poignantly remarked in this 
regard, ‘(…) the designation of center, left and right are in an academic sense not clear’57 as 
political parties take up agendas that are not consistent with free-market economic policy 
principles. 
 
Procedural center articulations. Apart from the aforementioned substantive articulations of the 
center ground, the interview data finally also reveals center conceptualizations that carry a more 
procedural connotation. By procedural we refer to those center articulations that are less 
concerned with matters of religious or economic doctrine/policy and more with the manner of 
doing things; that is with the behavioral dispositions of party officials towards political 
engagement, conflict, and competitors.  
In our data, numerous procedural center articulations can be detected, with party officials 
defining/justifying their median position in Egyptian politics by virtue of their willingness to 
facilitate dialogue and conciliation as well as engage in mediation between conflicting political 
parties. Examples of such articulations can be found in the deliberations of representatives from 
Wasat, the NWP, the RDMP and Hizb Ghad al-Thawra (Revolution’s Tomorrow Party, 
henceforth Ghad), all of whom sought to position their political parties as pursuant of a 
moderating role in the stand-off between Morsi and his adversaries towards the end of the 
latter’s presidency. 58  An illustrative case is here the deliberation by one Ghad official who, 
referring to the polarised atmosphere at the time of the Morsi presidency, asserted that there is 
                                                                 
56 Interview with NWP official (Cairo, 15 June 2013 
57 Interview with Watan official (Cairo, 19 June 2013) 
58 Interviews with officials from the NWP (Cairo, 15 June 2013), Ghad (Cairo, 19 June 2013) and the RDPM (Cairo, 
16 June 2013). See also N. El-Hennawy (2012) Centrist Politicians Hope to Evade Islamist-Secular Divide, Egypt 
Independent online, 07 September.  
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‘… a split into three [groups amongst parties]: the Islamists, represented by the FJP and the 
Salafist parties; the opposing side the liberals; and in the middle the moderate parties which 
currently have no [mediating] role or an effect’. 59 He thus regarded his as the ‘(…) the only 
liberal party that is taking a moderate position. We are trying to have consensus on everything, 
trying to reach a dialogue between all parties. The other liberal parties belong to the opposition, 
and they are extremely to the other side. They refuse to sit at one table.’ 60  Echoing Ghad, 
officials from the RDMP and NWP both stressed that the post-revolutionary situation demands a 
‘conciliatory tone’ and a mediating role, one which, according to the NWP official, his party was 
seeking to appropriate in the stand-off between the two political camps at the height of the Morsi 
presidency. 61  This said, however, although envisioning his party as a mediator between the 
Islamist and the liberal camps, the NWP official leaves no doubt that he is also governed by 
concerns over the dominance of Islamists when saying ‘(…) the Wafd tried to invent the idea of 
a democratic Egyptian alliance that would spoil the Islamist’s idea of diving society.’ 62 In this 
sense, the NWP’s proclaimed conciliatory language is to be taken with a pinch of salt, given the 
clear liberal bias detectable in the official’s deliberations. 
 
Center articulations, variance and context 
How then is one to make sense of this array of center articulations observable in the rhetoric of 
those party officials interviewed, and is it possible to detect any pattern in their usages across 
time? When it comes to the interview data at hand, a contextual reading of the rhetoric deployed 
by party cadres suggests that conceptualizations of the center ground varied over time and that 
this variance is, in all likelihood, connected to changes in the immediate political environment 
pre-post coup d’état. Indeed, the data reveals that, whereas pre-July the rhetorical onus of those 
interviewed revolved primarily around the religious center definitions alluded to above, these 
clearly lost their traction post-coup, being superseded by economically- infused center evocations 
and placements. The timing and direction of this observed shift in rhetorical onus, as well as the 
nature of the change in political environment and evidence from qualitative discourse analysis,63 
all lend credence to the assertion that the meaning(s) accorded to the center ground across the 
period under scrutiny were context-dependent; that is shaped by extralinguistic determinants.  
                                                                 
59 Interview with Ghad officials (Cairo, 16 June 2013).  
60 Ibid.  
61 Ibid.   
62 Ibid.  
63 Within qualitative discourse analysis the connection between speech/text and extralinguistic context has been 
widely researched and empirically established. See e.g. R. Wodak and M. Krzyzanovski (eds) (2008) Qualitative 
Discourse Analysis in the Social Sciences (Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan). 
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In the case at hand, it is not difficult to fathom this connect between rhetoric and context, 
given the radical political transformation the country experienced in the June to December 2013 
period. Recall in this regard that the first round of interviews in mid-June 2013 was conducted at 
a time when–following the ascendency to power of Islamist forces, including most prominently 
the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis64–discourses on the role of Islam in public life and policy 
had taken center stage in Egyptian politics.65 Within this atmosphere, political parties across the 
spectrum sought to brush up their religious credentials and dispel any accusations of being 
‘secularist’ and hence  of being perceived as ‘anti-Islamic’, particularly as at the time mass 
demonstrations calling for the resignation of the president and fresh elections were imminent.66 
Whilst the call to mass protests was mainly fuelled by popular anger at Morsi’s governance, no 
one at the time assumed that the called-for resignation of the president would diminish 
significantly the electoral potency of Islamist forces in upcoming elections and with it the 
prominence of the religious in public life.67 It is this context then of a competitive environment 
still dominated by Islamist players and discourse that may help explain the rhetorical prevalence 
of religiously- inspired center articulations and placements, even amongst so-called ‘secular’ 
party officials. Jostling for voice in a highly charged political environment, and one marked by a 
significant degree of uncertainty, ‘secular’ party leaders were, in fact, astutely aware that their 
prospective (electoral) fortunes may well be dependent on the degree to which they managed to 
pursue an oppositional stance towards Morsi and his government without appearing ‘anti-
Islamic’; hence their attempts at self-placement as religiously centrist.  
 By the time the second round of interviews had been conducted in November 2013, 
meanwhile, Egypt’s political climate had experienced a dramatic transformation, epitomized by 
the reversal in fortunes of its largest Islamist organization, the MB. Morsi had been ousted and 
imprisoned by the Egyptian armed forces, pro-Morsi protests brutally crushed, with hundreds of 
MB officials and activists arrested, and the MB and any affiliate NGOs banned by a court 
                                                                 
64 Zollner, Does Participation Lead to Moderation?, pp. 149-165.  
65 On the prominence of Islam in Egyptian public life post-uprising see e.g. N. Brown (2013) Islam and Politics in 
the New Egypt, The Carnegie Papers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  
66 Supported by the oppositional National Salvation Front (NSF),  the so-called Tamarrod Movement spearheaded 
the anti-Morsi campaign and calls for h is resignation and fresh elections. See e.g. P. Kingsley (2013) Protesters 
across Egypt Call fo r Mohamed Morsi to Go, The Guardian, 30 June. It emerged after the coup that Tamarrod was 
also backed by Egypt’s Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). See e.g. S. Roll (2015), Managing Change: 
How Egypt’s Military Leadership Shaped the Transformation, Mediterranean Politics 21(1), pp.23-42. 
67 At that time no one, in  fact, called for the d issolution of the MB/FJP. The MB was then only banned by court 
ruling following the ouster of President Morsi on the 23 September 2013. See e.g. D.D. Kirkpatrick (2013) Egyptian 
Court Shuts down the Muslim Brotherhood and Seizes its Assets , New York Times, 23 September. 
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ruling.68 The country was now in the hands of an army-backed interim government headed by 
the former head of the Constitutional Court, Adly Mansour and PM Hazem al-Beblawi who 
hailed from the ESDP. With the new regime’s crackdown on the MB, and its focus on issues of 
law-and-order as well as the economy–and with some polls indicating that public opinion had 
swung firmly against the group69–party officials (particularly from within the ‘secular’ camp) 
deemed it possible to reposition themselves politically, reducing (although not disregarding 
entirely) their onus on doctrinal matters and replacing it with a focus on matters of social justice 
and economic governance. 70  Indeed, amongst some of these officials, a palpable feeling 
prevailed that with the MB’s downfall the focus of party political debate could progress from 
matters of religion and state to the bread-and-butter issues of economic development, poverty 
alleviation, and social justice.71 As demonstrated above, for quite a few, in fact, the median of 
post-coup politics became firmly associated with advocacy of a mixed economy, with numerous 
officials asserting that their political parties were social-democratic in outlook or, short of that, 
favoring an economic model that combined market-economic principles with state control of 
strategic industries, retention of subsidies and targeted poverty alleviation policies. 72 For these 
party officials then, the new locus of post-MB center politics resided center-left.  
When it comes to procedural center articulations, finally, these too show variance over 
time, which we suggest is again the result of changes in political context. Indeed, whilst these 
articulations appear to have held some traction amongst a hand-full of party officials during the 
immediate pre-coup era, they were little evoked thereafter. In part, at least, this differential in 
significance can be explained by political developments on the ground and here in particular by 
the heightened levels of elite polarisation between proponents and adversaries of the Morsi 
government towards the end of the latter’s rule. As Kraetzschmar and Saleh have shown 
elsewhere, overall this period was marked by an ever-hardening ‘us-versus-them’ rhetoric and a 
diminishing willingness on both sides of the political equation to replace political brinkmanship 
with attempts at dialogue and conciliation. 73  Indeed, very few voices at the time sought to 
                                                                 
68 For an  anthropological observation of the post-coup crackdown on the MB see e.g. P. Hessler (2013) Keeping the 
Faith. In Three Sermons, Cairo’s Preachers Negotiate the Crackdown, The New Yorker, 7 October.  
69 According to an August 2013 Baseera poll, two-thirds of respondents disapproved of the MB and held negative 
views on its period in government. See e.g. Anon. (2013), Sentiments towards the Muslim Brotherhood, Baseera, 
27 August. 
70 See e.g. D. Butler (2013) Egypt in Search for Economic Direction, Briefing Paper, Chatham House, November.  
71 Follow-up interviews with RDPM, ESDP, NWP, Tajammu‘, FEP and PSAP officials (interviews held between 
September-November 2013).   
72 Interviews with ECP official (Cairo, 15 June 2013 and Cairo, 10 November 2013), and ESDP official (Cairo, 16 
June 2013).  
73 As discussed by Kraetzschmar and Saleh, the growth in political polarisation during the Morsi era was fuelled by 
contention over the country’s new constitution, the nature of the transition  process and the president’s style of 
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reconcile the two political camps, yet those that did–including, as we saw, officials from Ghad, 
the NWP and the RDMP–couched their advocacy of conciliation and moderation in centrist 
terms, thus presenting the two conflicting political parties as unreasonably entrenched and 
uncompromising. Whilst for those party officials concerned, this self-placement was justified as 
being in line with broader ideological stances, many of their adversaries considered this 
conciliatory positioning as nothing but an attempt to keep options open, given the uncertain 
outcome of the political conflict at the time. Arguably, this latter assertion appears to have found 
confirmation in the fact that this type of rhetorical center positioning subsided entirely post-
coup, with none of its advocates returning to this center conceptualization once it had become 
clear by November 2013 that the MB would no longer be part of the institutional political 
process.    
 
Conclusion 
This article presents a hitherto little-explored perspective on the study of ideological markers in 
Egyptian party politics; one that moves beyond more conventional approaches to examining 
party ideologies and taxonomies based on manifesto and expert survey data to an analysis of 
elite rhetoric. Honing in on one particular ideological marker–that of the center–it reveals that 
across the political spectrum party officials not only claimed a centrist disposition but that they 
entailed often multiple articulations of what precisely the center stood for. These articulations, as 
we saw, ranged from the religious to the economic and procedural, and are thought to have been 
strategically deployed by party officials depending on context.  
It is evident then that an investigative focus on party rhetoric enables us to uncover layers 
and shades of center evocations that are unlikely to reveal themselves through conventional 
models of party positioning. More significantly, perhaps, it presents an approach to the study of 
Egyptian (and Arab) party politics that safeguards against any uncritical adoption of Western 
ideological markers such as left, right and/or center which, although widely deployed by party 
elites in the region, may prove far less tangible and sustainable in contexts of ideological fluidity 




                                                                                                                                                                                                                
governance; pitting the MB/FJP-led government and its allies against a collection of opposition parties and 
groupings operating under the umbrella o f the NSF. See H. Kraetzschmar and A. Saleh, Political Parties and 
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